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from other social sciences like psychology to economics, has increased enormously in 
significance in the last two decades, transforming the ways in which economists view the 
individual behavior.  An important method by which its predictions and theories have been tested 
has been via laboratory experiments.  In this paper I survey and assess experimental tests of 
various applications of behavioral economics to the specific area of public economics, or 
“behavioral public economics”.  I first discuss the basic elements of behavioral economics, as 
well as some criticisms of the approach.  I then examine experimental tests of behavioral public 
economics using laboratory experiments, emphasizing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
experimental paradigm and the specific applications of experimental methods to behavioral 
public economics in three areas: public goods experiments, tax compliance experiments, and 
experiments on individual responses to taxes.  I conclude by suggesting topics and areas in which 
future experimental tests of behavioral public economics should prove especially useful. 
 
II. A BRIEF “TUTORIAL” IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
  The standard neoclassical economic model of human behavior is based on several main 
assumptions: that individuals are rational, that they have unlimited willpower, and that they are 
purely self-interested.  While these assumptions may be a useful starting point for the analysis of 
individual behavior, there is much accumulating evidence – often derived from laboratory 
experiments – that they are inaccurate and unrealistic depictions of many, perhaps most, 
individuals. 
Indeed, there is growing acceptance that, contrary to the standard neoclassical approach:      
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  individuals face limits on their ability to compute (e.g., “bounded rationality”, “mental 
accounting”) 
  they systematically misperceive, or do not perceive at all, the true costs of actions (e.g., 
“fiscal illusion”, “saliency”, “overweighting” of probabilities) 
  they face limits on their “self-control” (e.g., “hyperbolic discounting”, “Christmas 
savings clubs”, “automatic enrollment programs”) 
  they are affected by the ways in which choices are “framed” (e.g., reference points, gains 
versus losses, loss aversion, risk-seeking behavior) 
  they are influenced by the social context in which, and the process by which, decisions 
are made, and 
  they are motivated not simply by self-interest, but also by notions of fairness, altruism, 
reciprocity, trust, guilt, shame, morality, alienation, patriotism, social customs, social 
norms, and many other objectives. 
 
In short, individuals are not always the rational, outcome-oriented, self-controlled, selfish, and 
egoistic consumers envisioned by much of our standard theory. 
Behavioral economics uses these so-called “departures” from the standard assumptions as 
the starting point for a more realistic view on how individuals actually make choices.  As 
discussed in detail by Camerer and Lowenstein (2004), McCaffery and Slemrod (2006), 
Wilkinson (2007), and Angner and Loewenstein (2010), among others, “behavioral economics” 
can be broadly defined as an approach that uses methods and evidence from other social sciences 
(especially psychology) to inform the analysis of individual and group decision making.
1 
The emergence of behavioral economics is sometimes viewed as a recent phenomenon.  
However, the relevance of behavioral insights has long been part of economics, including the 
works of many of the most prominent economists, from Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, to Francis Edgeworth’s Theory of Mathematical Psychics, to Irving Fisher’s The 
Money Illusion, and to John Maynard Keynes’ The General Theory.  Even in the last fifty years, 
economists like Herbert Simon (Administrative Behavior), George Katona (Psychological 
Analysis of Economic Behavior), and Tibor Scitovsky (The Joyless Economy: The Psychology of 
                                                 
1 For more “popular” discussions, see Ariely (2008) and Thaler and Sunstein (2008).      
      4 
 
Human Satisfaction) have incorporated, indeed emphasized, the importance of psychology in 
individual decision-making.  In this light, the origin of the name “behavioral economics” is 
somewhat obscure.  One of the first uses was by Boulding (1958), who wrote that there will be 
movement toward “behavioral economics”, which “…involves study of those aspects of men’s 
images, or cognitive and affective structures that are more relevant to economic decisions”.  
Given the essential role of psychological insights in the field, together with the obvious truism 
that all economics concerns “behavior” in one form or another, a more descriptive name for the 
field is perhaps “cognitive economics”, as recognized early on by Boulding (1958). 
  The use of behavioral methods is not without some criticisms.  A common one is that 
there is no single unified “theory” of individual behavior that applies across the various 
individual behaviors.  Indeed, a “typical” behavioral economics paper often starts with some 
anomaly that standard theory cannot easily explain, proceeds to a specific model of the bias, and 
then concludes with an experimental demonstration of the “correct” explanation.  Such an 
approach clearly lacks the generality that is commonly associated with the neoclassical 
paradigm.  However, progress is clearly being made in modeling individual behavior.
2  Further, 
as I argue in the concluding section, I believe that it is futile to believe that one single model or 
modeling approach can hope to explain the diversity of human behavior. 
A second criticism of behavioral economics is that the focus is often on individual behavior 
(as well as on tests of the underlying assumptions of individual behavior), rather than on the 
broader dimension of aggregate, group, or market behavior.   Closely related to this criticism is a 
third one: although individuals may not always behave “rationally”, individual bias may well 
“wash out” in the aggregate, and it is aggregate behavior that is most relevant for economics.  As 
                                                 
2  Many modeling approaches have as their starting point “prospect theory” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), but 
much recent work incorporates many other approaches.  See Camerer and Lowenstein (2004), McCaffery and 
Slemrod (2006), Wilkinson (2007), and Angner and Loewenstein (2010) for detailed discussions.        
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noted by Glaeser (2004), “[t]he great achievement of economics is understanding 
aggregation…Our discipline has always been about the wealth of nations, not individuals”.  
Indeed, Becker (1962) demonstrated long ago that, as long as some individuals in a market 
respond predictably to incentives, markets will perform as predicted; that is, individual 
anomalies are less important than aggregate rationality.  This criticism is certainly an apt one.  
Even so, markets are the aggregation of individuals, so that a better understanding of individual 
behavior must necessarily help in understanding market behavior.  Also, to claim that behavioral 
economists do not consider the aggregate implications of behavioral issues is simply untrue, as 
shown by the work of Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) on tax salience, among many others. 
Perhaps most controversial in behavioral economics is the paternalistic implications of 
many behavioral insights.  If individuals have a limited ability to compute, if they do not 
perceive the true costs of actions, if they face limits on their self-control, if they are affected by 
the ways in which choices are framed, if they are influenced by the social context in which (and 
the process by which) decisions are made, and if they are weakly motivated, then giving them 
more options in choosing, say, where to invest their retirement savings may not make them better 
off.  Instead, some circumscribed choices (e.g., a “default” investment option in savings plans) 
may make them better off.  This is the underlying motivation for the “soft paternalism” notions 
that are most fully articulated in Thaler and Sunstein (2008). 
However, to many critics, moving forward with these paternalistic policy proposals is 
premature and unjustified.  They argue (again) that, although individuals may often make poor 
choices, aggregate rationality cancels out individual psychology.  Glaeser (2006) also argues that 
individual irrationality is not limited to individuals who make choices in markets but extends to 
individuals in all dimensions of their behavior, including those who make choices about      
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government policy; because individuals have a greater incentive to choose wisely in market 
settings than in government settings, he concludes that behavioral economics actually 
strengthens the case for limited government. 
Still, I believe that it is hard to avoid the conclusion that economists make normative 
judgments about “good” policy all the time.  What behavioral economics emphasizes is that it is 
precisely because human decisions are so sensitive to the context in which they are framed that 
we need to recognize more fully the role that our underlying cognitive processes settings play in 
our decisions.  As David Foster Wallace said in his 2005 commencement speech at Kenyon 
College, all of us are a slave to what he termed our “natural hard-wired default-setting, …which 
is to be deeply and literally self-centered and to see and interpret everything through this lens of 
self”.  He further argues that we need to work hard – and we need help – in getting free of this 
default-setting.  It is especially in this sense that behavioral economics, with its soft paternalism, 
may be able to help individuals in making decisions that, even from their own perspective, make 
them better off.  
 
III. THE METHODOLOGY OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
Many tests of behavioral economics theories have taken place via laboratory experiments.  
The use of laboratory experiments in economics began in earnest in the early 1960s with work on 
resource allocation under alternative forms of market organization.  Growth in its applications 
came with the establishment of a well-defined framework for experimental work by Smith (1976, 
1982), and laboratory methods are now widely accepted as a methodological approach in the 
analysis of theory and policy, especially of behavioral economics.
3 
A. Experimental Economics as “Induced Value Theory” 
                                                 
3 For comprehensive surveys of experimental methods, see Davis and Holt (1993) and Kagel and Roth (1995).      
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Experimental economics involves the creation of a real microeconomic system in the 
laboratory, one that parallels the naturally occurring world that is the subject of investigation and 
one in which subjects (usually students) make decisions that yield individual financial payoffs 
whose magnitude depends on their decisions.  The essence of such a system is control over the 
environment, the institutions, the incentives, and the preferences that subjects face.  Of these, 
control over preferences is particularly crucial.  As emphasized by Smith (1976), “[s]uch control 
can be achieved by using a reward structure to induce prescribed monetary value on actions.”
4 
Smith (1982) identifies a set of sufficient conditions for control over preferences to be 
established: 
  Nonsatiation: Subjects prefer more to less of the reward medium. 
  Saliency: The rewards received by subjects are related to their decisions, so that subjects 
recognize that their actions affect their outcomes. 
  Reward Dominance: The rewards are large enough to offset any subjective costs or 
benefits that subjects place on participation in the experiment.  
  Privacy: each subject knows only his or her own payoffs, so that they do not receive any 
subjective value from the payoffs of other subjects. 
 
Nearly all recent experimental studies invoke these conditions.
5 
Several other procedures should also be followed in experiment.  The experiment should 
be administered in a uniform and consistent manner to allow replicability.  The experiment 
should not be excessively long or complicated, since subjects may become bored or confused.  
Subjects must believe that the procedures described to them are the procedures actually followed.  
The instructions provided to subjects should be understandable, should avoid the use of examples 
that lead subjects to anchor on certain choices that are the focus of the experiment, and should be 
                                                 
4  Smith (1976) goes on to write that a maintained assumption in experimental economics is the following:  “[g]iven 
a costless choice between two alternatives, identical except that the first yields more of the reward medium… than 
the second, the first will always be chosen (preferred) over the second”.  It is in this sense that Smith (1976) refers to 
experimental economics as “induced value theory”. 
5  There are, however, some exceptions to these conditions.  For example, one does not want to impose Privacy in an 
experiment on, say altruism because the payoffs to others are an essential part of the research issue.      
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phrased in “neutral” rather than “loaded” terms, in order to mask the context of the experiment 
and to avoid direct reference to the real-world phenomena under investigation.
6 
7 
B. Why Use Experimental Methods? 
On some level, the use of experimental methods derives from a fundamental problem 
with economics.  Like other sciences, economics is based on the development of theory and on 
the ability of that theory to explain observed activities.  However, unlike some other sciences, 
especially the natural sciences, economics faces substantial difficulties in empirically testing the 
predictive power of its theories using data from the naturally occurring world.  Given the 
dizzying array and complexity of forces that operate in market (and non-market) systems, 
economists can never be quite certain that they are “holding constant” the many factors that may 
be driving individual choices, so that they can focus on the “true” driving factors that are the 
object of empirical testing.  Methods for achieving such identification have become increasingly 
sophisticated over time, especially with the use of so-called “natural experiments” and 
“controlled field experiments”.  Even so, there are few instances in which such identification is 
uncontroversial (Leamer, 1983). 
There are of course numerous avenues for testing the predictions of behavioral 
economics, aside from experimental methods, including the use of hypothetical choices, natural 
experiments, controlled field experiments, and even process measures like magnetic resonance 
imaging.  Of special note are the increasing examples of empirically based tests of behavioral 
economics, as demonstrated by tests of tax salience (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft, 2009; 
                                                 
6  Neutrality increases the experimenter’s control over subject preferences, and avoids leading subjects to invoke 
different “mental scripts”, which may enable them to fill in (potentially) missing information in the instructions but 
which also may unpredictably influence their choices.  It is sometimes claimed that the use of neutral instructions 
limits the ability to generalize from the experimental to the naturally occurring setting.  In fact, however, as argued 
by most experimental economists, it is not possible to generalize beyond the laboratory unless one uses neutral 
instructions, since the experimenter cannot control (or induce) the values that subjects associate with loaded terms. 
7  See Davis and Holt (1993) for examples of instructions for a variety of experiments.      
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Finkelstein, 2009), of savings programs (Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman, 1998; Madrian and 
Shea, 2001; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz, 2009), of the design of 
health insurance plans (Kling et al. 2009; Abaluck and Gruber, 2009), and of financial assistance  
in college applications (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton, 2006; Bettinger et al. 2009).
8  Even so, 
experimental methods have often been a common approach, and economists have increasingly 
begun to emulate the methods of natural scientists by conducting carefully controlled laboratory 
experiments.  
Economics generally and public economics specifically have profited from the use of 
laboratory experiments, for several reasons.  Econometric data on research questions obtained 
from the naturally occurring world can be unreliable, can fail to show the variation or 
distinctions of interest, or can fail to provide sufficient identification to discern “cause and 
effect”.  Indeed, in some cases data simply cannot be assembled outside the laboratory because 
the real world setting of relevance does not exist.  For its part, theoretical analyses often cannot 
incorporate fully, appropriately, or tractably many relevant factors. 
What can experiments do?  Unlike standard theoretical work, experiments are not as 
constrained by the same degree of simplification required in analytical studies, which allows the 
impact of numerous factors not amenable to theoretical work to be examined precisely and 
unambiguously in a controlled environment.  Unlike traditional empirical work based on 
naturally occurring data, experiments generate data under settings in which there is control over 
extraneous influences.  Laboratory experiments also provide a controlled environment that 
allows one to examine the mechanisms of interest, as well as the changes in these environments 
and institutions, in isolation from each other. 
                                                 
8  See DellaVigna (2009) for a survey of many field studies of behavioral economics.      
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As I discuss later, there are some obvious limitations of experimental methods.  However, 
given the limitations of theoretical and econometric work, there are, I believe, compelling 
reasons for the use of experiments, as an additional (and not as the only) methodological tool, in 
large part because laboratory experiments give a researcher the twin advantages of control 
(including data generation and replicability from this control) and flexibility. 
First, laboratory methods allow the investigator to control the institutions and incentives 
facing subjects in order to investigate the main issue of interest.  Relatedly and importantly, 
laboratory methods allow the investigator to generate data on individual and group choices in 
settings where these institutions and incentives can by varied singly and independently in order 
to examine responses to separate changes in these factors.  In the naturally occurring world, such 
control is seldom if ever available.  Data on, say, individual tax compliance decisions may not 
exist or, even if available, are likely to be imprecise, incomplete, and unreliable.  Further, data on 
the responses of individuals to the myriad factors thought to influence the compliance decision 
may confound these many influences, making it difficult to disentangle their effects on 
compliance.  Finally, it is likely that independent variation in many of these influences is simply 
not possible in the naturally occurring world, making it impossible to measure their effects on 
individual and group behavior.  Laboratory methods allow such data to be generated in a setting 
in which each relevant factor can be separately manipulated and outcomes of subject choices 
reliably observed.  They also allow other investigators to replicate more-or-less identical 
laboratory settings in order to determine whether the results are robust, an essential attribute of 
any science. 
  Second, laboratory methods give the investigator substantial flexibility in examining the 
effects of supposedly relevant considerations on individual and group decisions.  It is difficult to      
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imagine real-world settings in which, say, notions of fairness, altruism, and trust can be 
manipulated in a reliable manner.  Carefully designed experiments give the investigator precisely 
this flexibility, thereby allowing theories based on these notions (and the assumptions of these 
theories) to be tested in a controlled environment. 
C.  Some Limitations of Experimental Methods 
Despite the demonstrated usefulness of experimental methods, there are sound reasons 
for caution in interpreting and generalizing experimental results.  Some early experiments did not 
follow some now widely accepted procedures of the experimental paradigm, such as the use of 
repeated decisions and of neutral instructions.  Much early work also lacked realism because 
values of the various policy parameters did not approximate real-world values. 
Although more recent experimental research has generally addressed these problems, 
some concerns remain, some of which are more legitimate than others. 
A common criticism of experimental economics is that the student subjects typically used 
may not be representative of taxpayers.  However, there is now much evidence that the 
experimental responses of students are seldom different than the responses of other subject pools 
(Plott, 1987).  In a more fundamental sense, there is no reason to believe that the cognitive 
processes of students are different from those of “real” people, which suggests that the burden 
must be on skeptics to prove that these processes actually do differ. 
Another common criticism is that it is not possible to control for many relevant factors in 
the laboratory.  However, if one cannot control for such factors in the laboratory where the 
experimenter establishes the institutions, the rules, and the reward structure, then one cannot 
hope to control for these factors in the naturally occurring world.      
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Of more legitimate concern, the results may well be sensitive to the specific experimental 
design.  Indeed, a laboratory experiment is only as good as its design: if the institutions and 
environments imposed in the lab do not parallel systems of interest in the world, the resulting 
experimental data can be useless or misleading.  Replication is therefore crucial. 
It is also possible that subjects may modify their behavior simply because they know that 
they are participating in an experiment, exhibiting more “obedience to authority” and more “pro-
social behavior” in the laboratory than in the naturally occurring world (Levitt and List, 2007).  
Most critically, there is a certain artificiality in any laboratory setting.  A decision to report, say, 
three tokens of income in a tax compliance experiment is clearly different from a decision to 
report actual income on an annual tax return, even if the laboratory incentives are salient.  In 
particular, the laboratory setting cannot capture certain types of incentives (e.g., a catastrophic 
loss such as jail), and it cannot capture the social stigma that some surveys suggest is an 
important factor in taxpayer reporting. 
The crucial issue in experimental methods is therefore the “external validity” of 
laboratory methods; that is, do the results in the laboratory apply more broadly to the “naturally 
occurring world”?  This is an issue that cannot be answered in general for all experimental 
studies, but must be addressed in each specific case.  (It is also an issue that controlled field 
experiments must address.
9)  For example, in the specific case of tax compliance experiments, 
there is now emerging evidence that the results found in the laboratory do in fact achieve such 
external validity.  Alm, Bloomquist, and McKee (2010) present several types of evidence that 
relates directly to the use of student subjects.  Preliminary examination of these data indicate that 
the experimental responses of students are seldom different than the experimental responses of 
                                                 
9 For example, field experiments do not fully control subject valuations of commodities used in the field, they 
cannot generalize beyond the specific subject pool that is investigated, and they face significant difficulties in 
conducting replications.      
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other subject pools, and that experimental data versus Internal Revenue Service data also indicate 
similar patterns.  These results are consistent with many other experimental studies that 
demonstrate that student and non-student subjects behave and respond similarly. 
In short, one must use the results from laboratory experiments with some care.  However, 
such use depends largely upon the purpose of the experiment.  According to Roth (1987), 





experiments in behavioral public economics have fallen into the first two categories.  However, 
this is now changing, and experiments are being increasingly used to illuminate public policy. 
 
IV. SOME APPLICATIONS TO BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC ECONOMICS 
In this section, I discuss some of the areas in behavioral public economics that have 
employed laboratory experiments.   My discussion here is necessarily brief, and focuses on only 
three of the many areas in which experimental methods have been applied to behavioral public 
economics.  For a more detailed discussion of experimental methods, which also considers non-
behavioral applications, see Alm and Jacobson (2007). 
A. Public Goods
10 
                                                 
10  Note that there is also relevant experimental work on voting and voting processes. See Palfrey (2006) for a survey 
of work that has been done with laboratory experiments in political science, classified in four main categories: 
committee decision making, elections and candidate competition, information aggregation and committees, and 
voter turnout and participation games.      
      14 
 
The standard theory of public goods concludes that the Nash equilibrium is characterized 
by zero voluntary contributions to public goods, as individuals attempt to “free ride” on the 
contributions of others.  However, there are numerous examples from the naturally occurring 
world in which many individuals contribute positive amounts to public goods (e.g., public radio, 
volunteer work, and charitable donations).  Experiments have been employed both to determine 
the circumstances under which individuals will contribute and to determine mechanisms that will 
help overcome the free rider problem. 
A typical “voluntary contributions” experiment begins by assigning student subjects to 
groups.  Subjects are endowed with tokens and are isolated from each other.  Each subject is 
offered two possible “investments”, one in a private good and one in a public good.  The private 
good investment has higher returns for that individual, but the public good investment provides a 
return to all members of the group; that is, the public good investment is both nonrival (because 
all members of the group derive the same benefit from any member’s contribution) and 
nonexclusive (because subjects who do not contribute to the public good investment still receive 
the same group return).  Subjects are then asked to choose an allocation of tokens between the 
investments.  Because the total social return is greater for the public good than for the private 
good, the socially efficient outcome is for everyone to contribute fully to the public good.  
However, as with the standard prisoner’s dilemma game, each individual has an incentive to 
keep all of his or her tokens because the private good investment has a higher personal return 
than the public good investment.  This contribution game is then repeated for a number of 
rounds, and the level of actual contributions is compared to the Nash equilibrium prediction 
(zero contributions) and the socially efficient outcome (full contributions).      
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There are numerous variants on this basic design.  While early work focused on “one-
shot” games, the standard approach in recent work has been to examine subject responses over 
multiple rounds.  The public good return is often linear with respect to the contributions, but it 
can be based on a “threshold” (or a “provision point”) in which the group return will only be 
provided if total contributions exceed some designated threshold; relatedly, “incentive 
compatible” mechanisms have been examined.  The return on the group investment can be 
varied.  Subjects with different levels of experience in the contribution experiments can be 
examined.  Similarly, subjects can remain in the same group for the entire experiment, or the 
assignment of subjects can be randomly varied from round to round.  Group size can also vary, 
from “small” to “large” groups, and the subject “type” can also change in order to examine 
whether, say, men behave differently than women or economics students behave differently than 
other students.  In most experiments, privacy is maintained, in the sense that individual subjects’ 
contribution choices are not revealed to other subjects, subjects are not allowed to communicate 
with one another, and subjects do not know anything about other members of the group.  
However, others’ choices can be revealed, group communication can be allowed via “cheap 
talk”, and individual identities can be shown to all subjects.  Alternately, privacy can be further 
enhanced by using a “double blind” procedure to shield the identity of the subjects’ 
contributions, not only from other subjects but also from the experimenter, so that data on each 
subject’s contributions cannot be linked to the specific subject’s identity by anyone. 
All of these experiments aim to answer the core questions of public goods provision.  
How much are people willing to contribute to a public good?  Of particular relevance to 
behavioral public economics, why do they contribute at all?  Also, what institutional and 
environmental factors can increase contributions?  It is noteworthy that many recent studies have      
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introduced new theories based upon behavioral economics.  These models introduce such factors 
as: altruism (Becker, 1974; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Cox and Sadiraj, 2007), impure and 
warm-glow altruism (Andreoni, 1989, 1990), inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), confusion versus altruism (Andreoni, 1995), and reciprocity 
(Sugden, 1984). 
In a survey of voluntary contributions experiments, Ledyard (1995) concluded that the 
results from the varied experiments are often contradictory.  Even so, he suggested a range of 
somewhat different “stylized facts” arising out of all of this work.  The stylized facts that are 
most relevant to behavioral public economics can be summarized as:  
  Many subjects contribute to a public good, sometimes in significant amounts. 
  There is substantial individual variation in contributions, suggesting that individuals are 
motivated by different considerations. 
  At least at the outset, subjects contribute halfway between the socially efficient level and 
the free riding level. 
  Contributions decline with repetition but eventually stabilize. 
  Individuals change their contributions in ways influenced by the experimental structure.  
For example, subjects tend to contribute at a higher rate if there is face-to-face 
communication (e.g., “cheap talk”), a larger group size, a higher marginal return on the 




Applying the standard economics-of-crime model of compliance of Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) in the laboratory is straightforward, and, beginning with the seminal 
experimental study of Friedland, Maital, and Rutenberg (1978), the basic design of most 
compliance experiments has been similar.  Human subjects in a controlled laboratory are told 
that they should feel free to make as much income as possible.  At the beginning of each round 
of the experiment, each subject is given income and must decide how much income to report.  
                                                 
11  See Torgler (2002) for a survey of experimental analyses of tax compliance.  Also, see Andreoni, Erard, and 
Feinstein (1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for surveys of the broader compliance literature.      
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Taxes are paid at some rate on all reported, but not on underreported, income.  However, 
underreporting is discovered with some probability, and the subject must then pay a fine on 
unpaid taxes.  This process is repeated for a given number of rounds.  At the completion of the 
experiment, each subject is paid an amount (the accumulated earnings) that depends on his or her 
performance during the experiment.  Various policy changes can easily be introduced, such as 
changes in audit probabilities or audit rules, in penalty rates, in tax rates, in public good 
provision, in institutions that affect tax equity or social norms, and in many other relevant 
policies or institutions. 
The main fiscal variables of interest in the compliance decision are audit, penalty, and tax 
rates, and these factors have been extensively examined.  Nearly all experimental studies have 
found that a higher audit rate (i.e., a greater probability of audit) leads to more compliance, with 
an estimated reported income-audit rate elasticity that varies within the narrow range of 0.1 to 
0.2, although this impact appears to be nonlinear, there is also evidence that many subjects 
appear to substantially overweight the probability of an audit, so that there is far more 
compliance than is predicted by expected utility theory.  Most studies have also found that 
compliance increases but only slightly with increases in the fine rate on unpaid, and that a higher 
marginal tax rate often (although not always) leads to less compliance.
12 
Of more relevance to behavioral economics, many behavioral factors have also been 
investigated, especially in recent work based on behavioral theories (Yaniv, 1999; Bernasconi 
and Zanardi, 2004; Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2007). 
                                                 
12 There are also experiments that link the voluntary contributions and the compliance literatures, by allowing for a 
public good financed by voluntary tax payments, experiments that examine demographic factors (e.g., sex, age), and 
experiments that analyze alternative audit selection mechanisms.  See Torgler (2002) Alm and Jacobson (2007) for a 
detailed discussion of these studies.      
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An especially important behavioral factor in many compliance studies is the role of social 
institutions and social processes, including the notion of a “social norm”.  Elster (1989) defines a 
social norm as a pattern of behavior that is judged in a similar way by others and that therefore is 
sustained in part by social approval or disapproval.  Consequently, if others behave according to 
the socially accepted mode of behavior, then the individual will behave appropriately; if others 
do not so behave, then the individual will respond in kind.  A social norm is therefore largely 
process-oriented, unlike the outcome-orientation of the neoclassical view of individual behavior.  
In the context of tax compliance, the existence of a social norm suggests that an individual will 
comply as long as he or she believes that compliance is the social norm; if noncompliance 
becomes pervasive, then the social norm of compliance disappears.  There are other concepts that 
describe the same basic phenomenon as social norms, such as “psychic costs” (Gordon, 1989), 
“moral sentiments” (Erard and Feinstein, 1994), “tax morale” (Pommerehne, Hart, and Frey, 
1994), “group conformity and social customs” (Myles and Naylor, 1996), and “intrinsic 
motivation” (Frey, 1992). 
In this regard, Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1993) demonstrated that government can 
increase this social norm (and thereby improve compliance) by ensuring that individuals have a 
say in the decision process by voting on the specific way in which their taxes are to be used and 
by spending taxes in ways consistent with citizen preferences; that is, subjects pay more in taxes 
when they choose the use of their taxes by voting than when the identical use is imposed upon 
them, compliance is greater when the vote is decisive than when the vote is close, and 
compliance is significantly and dramatically lowered by the imposition of an unpopular program.  
Similarly, Alm, McClelland, and Schulze (1999) showed that the social norm fell, often 
collapsing virtually to zero, when there was a social expression via group selection of the fiscal      
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regime of a willingness to tolerate tax evasion, such as a majority vote in favor of reduced 
enforcement on detected evasion; however, they also found that the norm can be improved (and 
compliance can be increased) when there was a social expression of an unwillingness to tolerate 
tax evasion.  Torgler (2003) and Gërxhani and Schram (2006) also found experimental evidence 
that that the social norm can be affected by the institutions that face individuals, by individuals’ 
attitudes toward these institutions, and by individual participation in the selection of those 
institutions. 
Other experiments have also demonstrated the role of social norms in compliance.  For 
example, Webley et al. (1991) found that individuals who have a negative attitude toward 
government comply less as a result.  Alm, Sanchez, and de Juan (1995) found significant 
differences in the compliance behavior of student subjects in similar experiments but in different 
countries (Spain versus the United States), thereby suggesting that societal attitudes toward 
compliance exert a measurable impact on tax compliance. 
In other work on institutions and processes, Spicer and Thomas (1982), Friedland (1982), 
Beck, Davis, and Jung (1991), and Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992) found that institutional 
uncertainty about tax, penalty, and audit rates can affect compliance, although with sometimes 
offsetting effects.  In earlier work, Spicer and Becker (1980) conducted experiments that 
suggested that perceptions of “fiscal inequity” affect compliance: compliance was lower (higher) 
among subjects who were told that their tax rate was higher (lower) than that of others. 
Some “stylized facts” that emerge from this work on compliance, especially related to 
behavioral issues, include: 
  Audit rates affect compliance – More audits increase compliance but in a non-linear way, 
so that the deterrent effect diminishes with higher audit rates.  Further, audits have a 
“spillover” effect, or an increase in compliance independent of revenues generated      
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directly from the audits themselves, and audits have a greater deterrent effect than fines, 
despite their theoretical equivalence (at least in an expected value sense), 
  Perceptions of audit rates affect compliance – Individuals appear to substantially 
overweight a (low) probability of audit. 
  Tax rates affect compliance – The level of tax rates matters, but one’s tax rate relative to 
others’ (e.g., perceptions of fiscal inequity) also is relevant.  Further, the use of taxes 
affects compliance, especially when subjects can choose these uses. 
  Process (versus outcome) affects compliance – Social norms can be affected by the 
institutions that face individuals, by individuals’ attitudes toward these institutions, and 
by individual participation in the selection of those institutions.  
  Simplicity versus complexity affects compliance, but in ways that remain unresolved. 
 
More broadly, compliance is driven by far more than the purely financial considerations of 
detection and punishment, but in ways that are not yet fully understood. 
 
C. Behavioral Responses to Taxes 
Taxes can cause real behavioral changes by pushing taxpayers into evasion activities, as 
discussed earlier, and into other types of decisions; that is, the return on the taxed activity is 
reduced because of the tax, and people should tend to participate less in the taxed activity.  Aside 
from tax compliance behavior, the type of response that has been most studied is some aspect of 
labor supply response.  In these experiments, subjects are provided with a work task (e.g., typing 
numbers into a computer) and a leisure task (e.g., playing a game).  During short work periods, 
they work, and they are paid by the productivity of their work (e.g., the number of keystrokes 
typed).  They may be able to choose the length or frequency of breaks from work, in which they 
perform the unpaid leisure task.  Over subsequent periods, different taxes are imposed on the 
return from the work task.  Work effort or time worked can then be studied. 
Swenson (1988) first conducted these work behavior experiments.  His experimental 
results supported the existence of a Laffer curve in that work effort decreased with increases in 
the tax rate beyond some level.  Sillamaa (1999a, 1999b) also examined this issue; however, in 
her design subjects were paired and the tax rate was endogenously determined by the worker’s      
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partner.  She found that a zero marginal tax rate increased work effort and that work effort was 
higher under a linear than a nonlinear tax schedule.
13  Other work on labor supply responses 
includes Blumkin, Ruffle, and Ganun (2008), who found that subjects responded differently to an 
income tax than to an equivalent consumption tax.  Similarly, Sausgruber and Tyran (2005) 
examined differential subject responses to taxes that, at least in theory, are equivalent (e.g., direct 
versus indirect taxes), and found differential responses, despite the predictions of theory. 
Other papers examining real responses to taxes have taken varied approaches.   For 
example, de Bartolome (1995) investigated whether people respond to average or marginal tax 
rates.  He showed tax schedules to students, and asked them to choose between an untaxed (but 
lower return) and a taxed (and higher return) savings vehicle, as returns were varied.  His 
experimental results suggested that many subjects appeared to base their decision on the average 
tax rate.  Baron and McCaffery (2003) also showed that individuals may not accurately perceive 
the relevant tax burden; that is, they tended to underestimate the total tax burden when the 
burden was distributed across many smaller taxes.   
 
V. CONCLUSIONS: SOME FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
It is, I hope, apparent that laboratory experiments on behavioral public economics have 
considerably expanded our knowledge of many dimensions of the field.  We now know much 
more about why people contribute to public goods, about why they pay their taxes, and about 
how individuals respond to tax incentives.  Indeed, to date the main purpose of behavioral 
economics has been to understand how people make decisions, and the main purpose of 
experimental work on behavioral public economics has similarly focused on examining 
                                                 
13 For other Laffer curve experiments, see Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2003) and Lévy-Garboua, Masclet, and 
Montmarquette (2005).      
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individual decisions.  Accordingly, I conclude by discussing several areas in behavioral public 
economics to which the future application of laboratory methods seems especially valuable.  
These areas fall into three main categories: testing new areas (and developing new theories) of 
individual responses to taxes; moving beyond individual decisions to the aggregation – and the 
evolution over time – of individual decisions to group behavior; and incorporating other social 
sciences (e.g., sociology, anthropology) in order to understand better which features of naturally 
occurring settings are likely to affect individual and group decisions. 
In the first area – testing new areas (and developing new theories) of individual responses 
to taxes – there is much scope for experimental work.  Focusing only on tax compliance, I 
believe that experimental methods could be usefully applied to such behavioral issues as: 
  How does the presence of taxpayer uncertainty about one’s “true” taxable income (or 
other aspects of the tax system) affect compliance? 
  Does tax simplification contribute to more – or less – tax compliance?  Put differently, is 
compliance greater or lower in a simpler versus a complex tax system, and can better tax 
agency services improve taxpayer compliance? 
  Can positive inducements to the group (e.g., public goods, social insurance programs) 
and/or to the individual (e.g., lotteries) improve compliance? 
  Can individuals “coordinate” their compliance decisions, perhaps via communication? 
  How is information about enforcement disseminated among taxpayers, and how do 
taxpayers respond to this information? 
  Can social norms be deliberately and predictably affected by government policies? 
  How do perceptions of “fiscal inequity” affect compliance? 
  Under what circumstances does greater enforcement increase compliance, and when does 
it instead lead down a “slippery slope” that destroys “trust” and crowds out “intrinsic 
motivation”? 
  Does public disclosure of audit results act as a non-financial deterrent? 
  Is compliance affected by the “cost” – financial or emotional – of an audit? 
 
Of these issues, I believe that the most important is whether and how compliance is affected by 
societal institutions and social processes (including individual choice of these institutions and 
processes).  For example, how is compliance affected by the use of tax revenues and the ways in 
which this use is determined?  There is already some experimental work on some of these issues.       
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For example, Alm and McKee (2004) examine the coordination aspect of compliance, Kirchler, 
Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008), in their “slippery slope” framework, examine when psychological 
factors work/fail, and Alm, Cherry, Jones, and McKee (2010) examine the effects of complexity 
and of government services that reduce this complexity on tax compliance.  Even so, much 
additional work is required. 
Similarly, in other areas of individual taxpayer responses to taxes, there are many 
dimensions of behavior that can be usefully examined in the laboratory but that so far remain 
largely unexplored.  Do individuals respond differently: 
•  To a tax credit versus an equivalent tax deduction? 
•  To a tax discount from a “high” tax base versus an equivalent tax surcharge from a “low” 
tax base? 
•  To a tax change framed as a percentage change versus as an absolute (dollar) change? 
•  To a tax change defined in terms of their own tax liability only versus an equivalent tax 
change that compares their change to that of others?  
•  To the timing of a tax change (e.g., one “large” change versus many equivalent “small” 
tax changes)? 
•  To an ongoing (e.g., monthly) tax withholding versus an equivalent one-time payment? 
•  To savings programs that have “commitment” or “heuristic” devices (e.g., forced payroll 
savings plans) versus programs with only “traditional” financial incentives?  
 
The basic issue here is how individuals are affected in their tax-related decisions by such 
behavioral notions as saliency, mental accounting, and context. 
More broadly, there are many other dimensions of individual choices that are relevant to 
experimental tests of behavioral public economics:  
•  Intertemporal decisions – The effect of taxation on saving decisions has yet to be 
thoroughly examined in a laboratory setting (aside from some experiments on Ricardian 
equivalence), despite the fact that experiments seem ideally situated to examine 
individual choices over multiple periods.  Work on hyperbolic discounting, self-control, 
and mental accounting is clearly relevant here. 
•  Social insurance programs – Even though individual behavior in uncertain environments 
has been extensively studied in the laboratory, the broader behavioral implications of 
government-provided social insurance have been almost completely neglected.  Linking 
the public good aspects of social insurance programs with their uncertainty effects seems 
an especially promising area of research.      
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•  Behavior under uncertainty – Most all theoretical analyses of taxpayer behavior under 
uncertainty has utilized expected utility, despite its well-known shortcomings.  It is 
essential that other approaches that are based upon behavioral economics be applied and 
tested in the laboratory.  As noted above, applications to social insurance programs are 
clearly relevant here. 
 
These are all issues for which the standard neoclassical paradigm gives clear-cut theoretical 
answers.  However, these “answers” are often misleading or wrong.   Testing behavioral public 
economics notions in the laboratory presents the possibility of demonstrating behavioral 
responses that are more accurate and realistic, that show the relevance of social context and 
social process in decisions, and that have the “external validity” necessary for policy 
formulation.  In this regard, these behaviors need to be formally modeled.  The work of Chetty, 
Looney, and Kroft (2009) clearly demonstrates that it is possible to use these types of results to 
develop new theories of individual behavior that are based firmly on behavioral public 
economics notions.   In these modeling efforts, it is also essential to recognize that one theory 
may not fit all individuals at all times, or even the same individual at different times.  There is 
great diversity in individual behavior, and as argued by Gould (1996) in a different context (e.g., 
evolution), it is grossly misleading to represent a complex system by a single, so-called 
representative agent, who behaves in some average or typical way.  Instead, most systems have 
incredible variety – a “full house” of behaviors, in the words of Gould (1996) – and the proper 
understanding of any system requires recognition of this basic fact. 
The second area involves moving beyond individual decisions to the aggregation – and 
the evolution over time – of individual decisions to group behavior.
14  Ultimately, public policy 
considerations require that we be interested in understanding and explaining group behavior.  
                                                 
14 There is in fact some experimental work on aggregate or market behavior, including experimental tests of tax 
incidence in competitive and in imperfectly competitive markets and tests of tax equivalence propositions.  For 
example, see Kachelmeier, Limberg, and Schadewald (1994, Quirmbach, Swenson, and Vines (1996), Borck et al. 
(2002), Kerschbamer and Kirchsteiger (2000), and Ruffle (2005), and Riedl and von Winden (2007).      
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Behavioral public economics, especially in its experimental tests, allows us to understand better 
which features of naturally occurring settings are likely to affect individual and group decisions.  
For example, Bloomquist (2010) uses “agent-based modeling” approach, calibrating the model to 
observations from laboratory experiments, in order to simulate evolutionary changes in 
compliance.  He finds that the initial number of “honest” business owners declines quickly and 
significantly, being displaced by proprietors having either “defiant” or “strategic” compliance 
behaviors.  This approach, combining experiments with simulations, seems an especially fruitful 
area for future research. 
A third area for future research in public behavioral economics involves incorporating the 
insights from other social science like sociology and anthropology, in order to understand better 
which features of naturally occurring settings are likely to affect individual and group decisions.  
For example, the notion of “reciprocity” arises in large part from anthropology, and that of 
“adherence to group norms” from sociology.  Using these alternative perspectives to human 
behavior cannot help but expand our understanding of individual behavior, as demonstrated most 
clearly in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Akerlof (2002), and Akerlof and Shiller (2009).  
In short, I believe that the future prospects for the application of experimental methods to 
behavioral public economics are exciting and unlimited.  The challenge here is to design 
experiments that parallel the essential elements of the naturally occurring world that are of 
interest, so that the experiments can demonstrate the external validity necessary to inform policy.  
Such experiments have enormous potential to add further to our understanding of how 
government policies affect the “full house” of individual decisions, and to help in our devising 
government policies that address this “full house” of behaviors in devising its policies.   
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